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II. ARGUMENT. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ENTERED FINDINGS AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF 
EVIDENCE. 
A trial court's findings of fact will be overturned only if 
the trial evidence clearly preponderates against those findings. 
Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176, 179 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002). But here, 
in at least the following respects, the evidence does not merely 
preponderate against the trial court's findings, there simply is 
no evidence to support them. 
1. The Diamond Ring. 
The trial court found the purchase price of the diamond ring 
appellee (Mrs. Shaw) purchased during the marriage to be 
$2400.00. Record on Appeal, pg. 198, H77. Mrs. Shaw admits 
there is nothing in the record which even suggests that to be the 
price she paid for the ring let alone a fair approximation of its 
current value. Appellee's Brief pg. 12. Mrs. Shaw did not offer 
any evidence of the price she paid for the ring. The only 
evidence Mrs. Shaw offered as to the ring's value was her sale of 
the ring to her mother for $500.00, Record on Appeal, 318, pg. 77 
lines 18-21, which the trial court found to be for less than the 
rings actual value. Record on Appeal, pg. 198, 1177. 
Appellant (Mr. Shaw) offered the only evidence of its value. 
First, Mr. Shaw's evidence revealed the insurance appraisal value 
to be $4500.00. Record on Appeal, 318, pg. 78, lines 5-9. 
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Second, Claudia Bennion testified that Mrs. Shaw told her she 
purchased the ring for $5000.00. Record on Appeal, 318, pg. 108, 
lines 16-18. The trial court's finding the purchase price of the 
ring was $2400.00 was not simply a matter of resolving 
conflicting evidence. It is one example of the trial court's 
having entered findings with no evidence in support and in the 
face of uncontradicted evidence to the contrary. 
2. Mr. Shaw's Tools as they Relate to the Diamond Ring. 
As Mrs. Shaw correctly argues, Mr. Shaw did not offer 
detailed evidence of the value of Mr. Shaw's pre-marital 
construction tools but testified briefly the tools were worth 
thousands of dollars. Record on Appeal 318, pg. 201, lines 9-14. 
Mrs. Shaw offered no evidence of the tools' value. There was no 
reason to value those tools for the sake of this record because 
as Mr. Shaw's pre-marital, separate property the tools were not 
within the trial court's jurisdiction to divide. Id. Neither 
party requested the trial court to find the tools' value. 
Nonetheless, without any evidence in support, the trial 
court apparently accepted Mrs. Shaw's argument that the diamond 
ring was equal in value to the tools in Mr. Shaw's possession and 
offset one against the other. Record on Appeal, pg. 198, %19 & 
pg. 2 06, %5. There was insufficient evidence to make any finding 
regarding the tools' value. Out of thin air, the trial court 
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found the diamond ring's purchase price to be $2400.00 but the 
trial court made no finding as to the ring's current value in 
spite of the insurance appraisal which valued the ring at 
$4500.00. The trial court's finding offsetting the value of the 
tools in Mr. Shaw's possession against the value of the diamond 
ring in Mrs. Shaw's possession is unsupported by any evidence. 
3. The Time Share Interests. 
The trial court established the value of each time share 
interest to be zero, awarded that zero dollar interest to Mr. 
Shaw and ordered him to serve the ongoing, monthly debt. But 
then the trial court found he should not be allowed to deduct 
from his income the $400.00 per month expense of that debt 
service. Once again, that order is not merely against the weight 
of the evidence, it is without supporting evidence and in fact 
conflicts with the trial court's other findings. 
The only possible basis for the trial court's ruling is the 
parties' testimony the time share interests are a luxury item and 
Mrs. Shaw's testimony she could not sell the interests but may be 
able to find someone to take over the payments. Record on 
Appeal, 318, pg. 33, lines 21-25, pg. 34, lines 1-6, pg. 207 
lines 11-25 and pg. 208, lines 1-5. First, whether or not the 
time share interests are a luxury does not change the fact Mr. 
Shaw still has to pay for them every month. Those $400.00 a 
5 
month payments substantially impact Mr. Shaw's ability as the 
paying spouse to provide support. Second, there was no evidence 
Mr. Shaw could easily transfer the interests and be free of the 
debt. To the contrary, Mr. Shaw testified he would keep the 
interest for which the payment is $150.00. Record on Appeal, pg. 
207, lines 10-21. As to the other interest, there is no evidence 
a transfer of the interests was pending or even imminent. The 
monthly timeshare payments are a real and ongoing expense. The 
trial court abused its discretion in disallowing Mr. Shaw the 
$400.00 a month expense of the timeshare payments. 
These examples of the trial court's unsupported findings and 
all those discussed in Mr. Shaw's primary brief reveal the trial 
court abused its discretion in entering findings against the 
weight of the evidence or with simply no evidence in support. 
Mr. Shaw respectfully requests the Court to remand the matter to 
the trial court with instructions to enter findings consistent 
with and supported by the evidence. 
B. ALIMONY'S ESSENTIAL EQUITY. 
Mr. Shaw does not argue that payments on a debt which the 
trial court allocates to one party as it divides the marital 
property aren't properly included in that party's financial 
statement to determine that party's real financial ability. 
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Rather, Mr. Shaw argues the trial court can and should judge that 
financial ability in different ways as appropriate in different 
contexts. For example, in determining child support, the trial 
court will judge the parents' real ability to pay and real need 
to receive support based on all their real expenses. But in 
judging property division and alimony, the trial court in its 
discretion can and should consider not only the amount but also 
the nature of each parties' expenses. 
Here, the trial court abused its discretion in first 
ordering Mrs. Shaw to be liable for her post-separation expenses 
but then making Mr. Shaw actually pay those expenses in the false 
name of alimony. Similarly, the trial court abused its 
discretion by making Mr. Shaw responsible to pay for Mrs. Shaw's 
seventeen year old son's new car and private school tuition by an 
award which in form is alimony but in substance is child support 
for the benefit of a seventeen year old, former step child. With 
all due respect, Mr. Shaw's argument on appeal is that the trial 
court did not consider or perhaps even appreciate that inherent 
conflict in its findings and resulting decree. At the very 
least, the trial court should acknowledge and explain its having 
entered those conflicting findings. Better yet, the trial court 
should enter findings free of those conflicts. That is, Mrs. 
Shaw's post-separation expenses and expenses related to her 
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seventeen year old son for whom she receives child support 
unrelated to this action should be excluded from the alimony 
analysis here. 
C. MS. UNDERHILL'S TESTIMONY WAS ADMITTED IMPROPERLY. 
As expert testimony in general and especially in rebuttal, 
the trial court's admission of Ms. Underhill's testimony is 
reversible error. 
1. Unqualified, Undisclosed Expert Testimony. 
Expert witness testimony is welcome and useful as carefully 
admitted. To rely on an expert's testimony, one must disclose 
early and in due course the expert's conclusions and the basis of 
those conclusions, usually in a written report for that purpose. 
See, e.g., Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1994) . Here, 
there is no dispute Mrs. Shaw didn't complete or even attempt the 
process necessary to disclose and qualify Ms. Underhill as an 
expert witness. Rather, the dispute lies in whether Ms. 
Underhill's testimony was expert witness opinion or fact witness 
observation. 
On appeal, Mrs. Shaw candidly admits she called Ms. 
Underhill to testify only for her expert opinions as to the 
following: 
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a. Mr. Shaw's allocation of income tax expenses and 
the deductibility of his certain claimed exemptions under IRS 
regulations; 
b. Mr. Shaw's having caused the parties to be at 
increased risk of audit or other IRS action; and, 
c. That the cure would be for one of the parties to 
amend his or her income tax return. 
Appellee's Brief on Appeal, pg. 21. Ms. Underhill offered no 
testimony as to facts not already in evidence. The tax return 
already was in evidence and speaks for itself regarding its 
contents. Record on Appeal, 318, pg. 48, lines 9-14, pg. 226, 
lines 2-7. Ms. Underhill did not add nor subtract any fact. She 
did not prepare Mr. Shaw's return. She knew nothing of its 
foundation. The only fact testimony she offered was regarding 
Mrs. Shaw's return which as discussed below should have been 
raised as part of Mrs. Shaw's case in chief. Record on Appeal, 
318, pg. 257, lines 3-7. 
The obvious purpose for Ms. Underhill's testimony was to 
record her opinion. Her testimony was of expert opinion and not 
of objective fact. Mrs. Shaw's plain failure to qualify her as 
an expert disqualifies her testimony for any purpose. 
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2. Plain Rebuttal. 
Ignoring for the moment the expert quality of Ms. 
Underhill's testimony, it fails even as plain rebuttal. Mrs. 
Shaw claims Mr. Shaw opened the door to her expert witness's 
testimony regarding the full scope of his tax filing by a one 
sentence answer to her one sentence question on cross-
examination. Record on Appeal, 318, pg. 226, lines 8-10. The 
entire exchange on which Mrs. Shaw relies was her asking Mr. Shaw 
if he participated in the preparation of his tax return and his 
simple answer yes. .Id. Mrs. Shaw's timing of that single 
question and her elaborate rebuttal to it reveal that Mrs. Shaw 
planned from the start to introduce Ms. Underhill's expert 
testimony on rebuttal so Mr. Shaw could not respond to it. 
Rebuttal testimony need not be a direct response to direct 
testimony but may be used to explain or refute even the 
reasonable inferences the fact finder may derive from an 
opponent's testimony. Astill v. Clarkf 956 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1998). But here, Mr. Shaw offered no direct testimony, 
reasonable inference, or even the slightest hint of the point 
Mrs. Shaw raised for the first time in rebuttal through Ms. 
Underhill. It was not part of Mr. Shaw's case. It was not part 
of Mr. Shaw's defense. Nor was it the kind of rebuttal testimony 
intended to refute Mr. Shaw's credibility. Ms. Underhill did not 
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testify that Mr. Shaw had been untruthful in his testimony 
regarding his return, nor could she. She knew no more facts 
about his return than would anyone else with a copy of it. 
"When the offering party contends that the undisclosed 
witness is necessary to rebut the adverse party's evidence, the 
issue hinges on whether the evidence 'sought to be rebutted could 
reasonably have been anticipated prior to trial.' 75 Am. Jur. 2d 
Trial § 371, at 570 (1991)." Turner, 872 P.2d at 1024. On 
appeal, Mrs. Shaw claims she called Ms. Underhill to respond to 
issues which she only knew of after Mr. Shaw testified. But Mrs. 
Shaw disclosed Ms. Underhill as a witness the afternoon before 
trial. Mrs. Shaw knew of the issue regarding the parties' 
mortgage interest deduction before trial but withheld it for 
rebuttal, hoping Mr. Shaw would not object. 
The subject of Ms. Underhill's testimony was a part of Mrs. 
Shaw's case in chief, which she chose as a matter of strategy to 
raise in rebuttal. She did so risking that it might be excluded 
as beyond the scope if Mr. Shaw objected. The trial court failed 
to exclude the testimony on that objection so it falls to this 
Court to exclude it now. 
3. Expert Rebuttal. 
Expert rebuttal is allowable in a narrow context wholly 
inapplicable here. Ironically, the very case on which Mrs. Shaw 
11 
relies is the best support for reversal. See, Astill, 956 P.2d 
at 1085 distinguishing Turner v. Nelson, 872 P.2d 1021 (Utah 
1994). First, in Astill, there was no issue of surprise because 
the experts proposed on rebuttal had been disclosed and 
designated properly. .Id. Astill recognized if that were not the 
case, the rebutting testimony should have been excluded. Xd. at 
1085-86 citingr Zanoletti v. Norle Properties Corp., 688 So. 2d 
952, 954 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). Second, in Astill and in 
every other case of its kind, the opponent first offered expert 
testimony in its defense in chief. Id. Because neither condition 
occurred here, Mrs. Shaw's expert rebuttal testimony should have 
been excluded. 
First, Mrs. Shaw disclosed Ms. Underhill as a witness just 
the day before trial. Exhibit A. Even then she did not disclose 
the most basic essence of her testimony, leaving Mr. Shaw to 
guess whom she was and what she might say. She never disclosed 
that Ms. Underhill was an expert and gave no prior notice of her 
opinions and their foundation. 
The requirement to disclose an expert and the expert's 
potential testimony may lie in a trial court order or in the 
parties' duty to supplement discovery. See, e. g., Turner, 872 
P.2d at 1024; Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah 
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1988). Here, in Interrogatory No. 15 served by mail on February 
8, 2 001, Mr. Shaw requested Mrs. Shaw to: 
List the name(s), address(es) and telephone number(s) 
of all persons who may have information regarding this 
action or whom you may call to testify at the trial of 
this matter. Include a statement of the substance of 
each person's knowledge and/or anticipated testimony. 
Exhibit B. Mrs. Shaw never responded to those interrogatories. 
In each of the reported cases, what saved the trial court from 
reversal in allowing the surprise witness's testimony was that 
the opposing party first had an opportunity to discover and 
prepare for the witness's testimony before trial. See, e.g., 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Utah 1988); 
Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525, 528 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1990); Erickson v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1323, 1326-27 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1990). Here, Mrs. Shaw's failure to respond and 
disclose Ms. Underbill's testimony should have barred her 
testimony. 
Second, Mr. Shaw did not propose any expert testimony 
regarding his tax returns which would have required Mrs. Shaw to 
propose her own expert to preserve fairness. Mrs. Shaw raised 
the issue of the parties' mortgage interest deduction for the 
first time through Ms. Underhill. 
13 
4, Harmless Error. 
There is no question the trial court's order for Mr. Shaw to 
amend his return to take just one-half of the mortgage interest 
deduction was in direct response to Ms. Underbill's unchallenged 
expert testimony; that is the only time the issue was raised. 
There is no question Mrs. Shaw's unchallenged expert testimony on 
rebuttal persuaded the trial court to take Mrs. Shaw's position 
on the issue. Mr. Shaw should have had early notice of that 
expert testimony, the right to have another expert study the 
opponent's expert's conclusions and the right to have his own 
expert testify in rebuttal. If that expert testimony had been 
presented properly and subjected to challenge as the adversary 
process demands, it is equally likely the trial court would have 
ordered Mrs. Shaw to amend her return to take none of the 
interest deduction. The trial court's allowing that surprise, 
unchallenged expert testimony was error, which cost Mr. Shaw the 
unnecessary expense of amending his return and to forfeit half of 
the mortgage interest deduction although the entire deduction is 
rightfully his. That error was by no means harmless. 
VII. CONCLUSION. 
The trial court abused its discretion in entering findings 
against the weight of the evidence or with simply no evidence in 
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support. The trial court also abused its discretion in awarding 
alimony beyond Mrs. Shaw's legitimate need and well beyond Mr. 
Shaw's ability to pay. Finally, the trial court erred in 
allowing Mrs. Shaw's surprise expert to testify on rebuttal. Mr. 
Shaw respectfully requests the Court to remand the matter to the 
trial court with instructions to enter findings consistent with 
and supported by the evidence, to strike the alimony award and to 
strike Ms. Underbill's testimony or to allow Mr. Shaw to 
challenge her testimony as the rules allow. 
Respectfully submitted on January 17, 2003. 
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SERVICE CERTIFICATE 
I certify that on January , 2003, two correct copies of 
the appellant's reply brief were served by mail to the following: 
JAMES L. WATTS 
3 9 Exchange Place, Ste. 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone (801) 994-0838 
Attorney for Petitioner and Appellee 
Dated January Z-\ , 2003. 
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Exhibit A 
JAMES I. WATTS (4768) 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Old Salt Lake Stock & Mining Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Tel: (801)994-0838 
Fax: (801) 994-0833 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELISSA J. SHAW, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SCOTT A. SHAW, 
Respondent. 
PETITIONER'S WITNESS AND 
EXHIBIT LIST 
Case No. 004907136 DA 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Melissa Shaw, by and through her attorney of 
record, and does hereby give notification of Petitioner's Witness and Exhibit List. The 
Petitioner intends to call as witnesses the following individuals: Melissa Shaw, 
Petitioner; Barbara Underhill, C.P.A.; Cindy Smith, Owner/Partner Redrock Brewing 
Company; Philip Trickey, Mover; Eric Barger, Mover; Jason Frank, Petitioner's Son; 
together with rebuttal witnesses presently unknown. 
Documents and Exhibits to be introduced: Backyard photo "before"; backyard 
photo "after"; photo of garage; photo of backyard "hot-tub"; Appraisal Report; Home 
Equity Loan Summary; 2000 Harley NADA Report; 2000 Tax Returns - Melissa Shaw; 
1999 Tax Returns - Joint; 1998 Tax Returns - Joint; 2000 W-2's - Both Parties; 1999 
W-2's - Both Parties; 1998 W-2's - Both Parties; 2000 Retirement Statement - Scott 
Shaw; Correspondence dated May 14, 2001 from Gayanne Schmid; Correspondence 
dated April 24, 2001 from James I. Watts; Payroll Pay-stub including YTD income -
Melissa Shaw; Payroll Pay-stub including YTD income - Scott Shaw; 2000 Harley Sale 
Agreement; Hyundai Sale Agreement; Trendwest Payment Agreement; WorldMark 
The Club Credit Terms/Agreement; 2000 Redrock Brewing Company 401k Statement -
Scott Shaw; Mountain America Home Equity Loan . 
DATED this ^jCf day of October 2001. 
I HEREBY certil 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
on the day of October 2001, that I mailed via United 
Stateo mail, postage pupaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petitioner's 
WITNESS AND EXHIBIT LIST to the following: 
Gayanne Schmid 
68 S. Main Street, Suite 800 
SLC, Utah 84101 
Exhibit B 
Gayanne K. Schmid (State Bar No. A6793) 
68 S. Main Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-8300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 






RESPONDENT'S FIRST SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES TO PETITIONER 
Case No. 004907136 
Judge Henroid 
Commissioner Bradford 
Respondent Scott Shaw hereby requests Petitioner Melissa Shaw, pursuant to Rules 26 
and 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to answer the following interrogatories in writing, under 
oath, within thirty (30) days after service. 
INSTRUCTIONS 
1. These interrogatories shall be deemed to be continuing interrogatories so as to 
require proper supplemental answers if further information is obtained or developed by you, your 
counsel, or your agents after the time that you respond to these interrogatories. 
2. If, after exercising due diligence to secure the information, you are unable to 
answer fully any of these interrogatories, you must answer to the fullest extent possible, specifying the 
reason(s) for your inability to answer the remainder and providing whatever information, or 
knowledge or belief you may have concerning the unanswered portion. 
3. Where the answer to any interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from a 
document, you may respond by providing a copy of the document as part of your answer to the 
interrogatory. 
4. If you object to an interrogatory or a subpart thereof, you must, nevertheless, 
answer the interrogatory or subpart to the extent that you deem it is not objectionable. 
DEFINITIONS 
1. The word "DOCUMENTS" is used herein in its customary broad sense, and 
refers to any kind of printed, typewritten, handwritten or otherwise recorded matter, of whatever 
character, of any kind or description, whether sent or received or neither, including originals, 
duplicates, reproductions, facsimiles or drafts. 
2. The terms "YOU" and "YOUR" refers to Petitioner Melissa Shaw, her 
attorneys, agents, and all persons acting or purporting to act on her behalf. 
3. The terms "RELATE" or "RELATING TO" include referring to, alluding 
to, responding to, concerning, connected with, commenting on, regarding, discussing, showing, 
describing, reflecting, analyzing, constituting, including, mentioning, in respect of, or about. 
4. The term "IDENTIFY" means as follows: 
(a) With regard to a person: state the full name, place of employment, 
the last known business or home addresses and telephone numbers. 
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(b) With regard to documents: state the author(s), addressee(s), title, 
date, brief summary of the contents, and any other information which would describe the 
document with sufficient specificity that it may be made the subject of a request for production 
of documents. In lieu of this requirement, you may either (1) state that the document has already 
been provided, with sufficient information so as to permit the identification of the precise 
document so referenced, or (2) provide the document in response to the concurrent Request for 
Production of Documents, which is being served on you at this same date, so long as the identity 
of the referenced document can be determined. 
INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatory No. 1: Please state the highest educational level you attained (e.g., 
grade 12 of high school or junior year of college). 
Interrogatory No. 2: Identify any degrees, certificates or formal training you may 
have received from any educational or technical institution? 
Interrogatory No. 3: Identify all places where you have been employed or engaged 
in business during the last three years, stating separately as to each employment or business: 
(a). The name, address and telephone number of the place where employed or 
where you engaged in business; 
(b). The inclusive period of time (from date to date) when you were self-
employed or engaged in business, and the reason for termination of that employment or business, 
if you are not longer so employed or engaged in business; 
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(c). Your job classification, title or position; 
(d). A brief description of your duties and responsibilities; 
(e). The nature of the employment or business (whether continuous or seasonal; 
full-time or part-time) and the number of hours worked per week; 
(f). The name of your immediate supervisor, boss or foreman; 
(g). the amount of wage, salary, or other remuneration, received and the manner 
in which you were paid (e.g., hourly, weekly, monthly, or annually, or on a piece work, 
incentive, or commission basis); 
(h) All involuntary pay deductions (e.g., taxes, FICA, etc.); 
(i) All voluntary pay deductions (e.g., stock purchase plans, payment of loans, 
etc.); 
Interrogatory No. 4: If you are not currently employed through your present 
employer(s) for forty hours each week, please state: 
(a) The reason(s) why you do not work a forty hour week; 
(b) Whether or not your employer(s) limits your work to less than forty hours 
per week; 
(c) The names of other potential employers and the type of work that you have 
made application for in the past twelve (12) months. 
Interrogatory No. 5: Please list the amount of all monthly income that you actually 
receive or that you receive any direct/indirect benefit from, other than income from your 
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employment or self-employment. The sources of income applicable to this interrogatory include, 
but are not limited to the following: 
commissions and bonuses; 
interest income; 









income from the sale/lease of real or personal property; 
income from any person with whom you share living accommodations; 
educational grants, stipends or scholarships. 
governmental assistance including, but not limited to, welfare, food stamps 
child support 
tips, etc. 
With respect to this interrogatory, please indicate the following: 
(a) The name and address of each source of income/benefit; 
(b) The reason that you receive the income/benefit; 
(c) The dates during each year when such income/benefit is received by you. 
Interrogatory No. 6: Do you receive an expense account or allowance for car, gas, 
food, cellular phone, per diem or anything else from your employer? If so, give the average 
amount during the discovery period, on a monthly basis, per type of expense. 
Interrogatory No. 7: State each and every debt which is owed to you, including 
child support, by any person, firm, corporation or other entity, and in connection with this 
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answer for each such debt, state: 
(a) The name and address of the person or entity owing such debt to you; 
(b) The amount due and owing you for each such debt; 
(c) The rate of interest being charged by you on any such debt and the maturity 
date of each such debt; 
(d) A description of the collateral or security, if any, which you have taken in 
connection with each such debt. 
(e) What efforts you are making, if any, to collect the debt(s). 
(f) What amount(s), if any, you have received in payment toward the debt(s). 
Interrogatory No. 8: With respect to your Financial Declaration recently filed with 
the Court, in support of the Motion for Temporary Support, please describe in detail your basis 
for each of the itemized monthly expenses. 
Interrogatory No. 9: Please state whether you own or have owned any interest in 
real property, including timeshares and for each piece of real property indicate: 
(a). The location the real estate in which you have an interest. 
(b). The nature of the interest which you claim in the real estate. 
(c). The name(s) of all persons or entities which hold legal title to the real 
estate. 
(d). At the date of acquisition of the property, the fair market value or purchase 
price of the real estate. 
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(e). If the property purchase was financed, the amount of the indebtedness at the 
time of purchase. 
(f). The amount of the downpayment on the property and the source of the 
downpayment. 
(g). Whether or not you claim to have contributed, directly or indirectly, any 
money or labor to the acquisition and/or improvement of said property and, if so, please specify 
the following: 
(1) The date of each and every contribution; 
(2) The amount of money or labor contributed; 
(3) The consideration for each and every contribution; and 
(4) All documents, records, or witnesses which will substantiate and 
prove your contribution. 
Interrogatory No. 10: Please identify (a) all motor vehicles currently owned or 
leased by you or Respondent; (b) the purchase price and/or downpayment; (c) date of purchase; 
(d) current indebtedness thereon; (e) the reasonable market value thereof; and (f) the title owner 
of each vehicle. 
Interrogatory No. 11: In connection with any pension, profit sharing, retirement, 
or stock purchase plan or any other similar plan provided to you by your employer or yourself, 
please state the following: 
(a) The cash value of each such plan as of the date on which these 
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Interrogatories are answered; 
(b) The cash value of each such plan as of the date of this marriage or the date 
on which such plan was entered into, whichever is later; 
(c) A detailed description of the assets which comprise each such plan; 
(d) Any and all withdrawals made by you from each such plan from the date of 
the marriage until the present. 
Interrogatory No. 12: List all of the banks or financial institutions in which you 
and/or the other party in this case have had any money or other property deposited or being held 
during the discovery period. This interrogatory pertains to both joint and individual accounts. 
Please list: 
(a) The name and address of each said bank or institution; 
(b) The account number of each account; 
(c) The name in which the account is/was held; and 
(d) If the account is currently open, the current account balance or, if the 
account is not currently open, the account balance at the time the account was closed. 
(e) Whether any account was ever funded, in whole or in part, with funds 
obtained by either party from his/her individual sources (pre-marital income, inheritance, etc.); 
Interrogatory No. 13: Describe all bank or any other institution accounts in which 
your name does not appear, but in which you deposited money within the discovery period, and 
please state with respect to each such account: 
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(a) in whose name the account appeared; 
(b) the name and address of the bank or other institution; 
(c) the account number; 
(d) the approximate date and amount of each deposit made by you; and 
(e) whether the account is still open and, if so, the present balance. 
Interrogatory No. 14: Please furnish a detailed inventory of all personal property , 
including furnishings, fixtures and appliances , acquired by the parties during the marriage. 
Please specify which items you believe should be awarded to you and which items should be 
awarded to Respondent and briefly state your reason for the division, if any. If your proposed 
division is based on the relative values of the property, please list the estimated value of each 
item. 
Interrogatory No. 15: List the name(s), address(es) and telephone number(s) of all 
person(s) who may have information regarding this action or whom you may call to testify at the 
trial of this matter. Include a statement of the substance of each person's knowledge and/or 
anticipated testimony. 
DATED: January 30, 2001 
GayWiie/K. Schmi^ 
iy\for Respondent 
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